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Abstract
The nations of the former Communist bloc face a task unparalleled in the annals of world
history. By promoting allocation of market resources based on politics and social policy instead
of economic efficiencies, the former regimes created economies of inefficiency. Committed eco-
nomic reformers face the task of reallocating resources from inefficient producers dependent on
government monies to competitive independent market players. This transformation is known as
privatization. Privatization is an arduous process, which cannot be accomplished all at once. By
shifting assets from uncompetitive players to competitive ones, privatization will impose economic
hardship on the public, which will demand the relief it is accustomed to receiving from political
leadership. Often, the reformers do not know how to garner public support for privatization. Pos-
itive results will emerge only after long-term sacrifice by the people. This article will identify
eight requirements for a successful privatization program and discuss the privatization efforts of
the former Czechoslovakia, its successor states, and Poland, comparing them and evaluating them
against the eight criteria.
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INTRODUCTION
The nations of the former Communist bloc face a task un-
paralleled in the annals of world history. By promoting alloca-
tion of market resources based on politics and social policy in-
stead of economic efficiencies, the former regimes created econ-
omies of inefficiency. Committed economic reformers face the
task of reallocating resources from inefficient producers depen-
dent on government monies to competitive independent market
players. This transformation is known as privatization.
Privatization is an arduous process, which cannot be accom-
plished all at once. By shifting assets from uncompetitive players
to competitive ones, privatization will impose economic hard-
ship on the public, which will demand the relief it is accustomed
to receiving from political leadership. Often, the reformers do
not know how to garner public support for privatization. Posi-
tive results will emerge only after long-term sacrifice by the peo-
ple. This article will identify eight requirements for a successful
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privatization program and discuss the privatization efforts of the
former Czechoslovakia, its successor states, and Poland, compar-
ing them and evaluating them against the eight criteria.
Different countries envision different privatization schemes.
Voucher-system privatization, where the state distributes owner-
ship shares in public companies to citizens, is one method.' A
second method of privatization is through a joint venture, in
which, typically, a foreign company forms a joint venture with a
state company.2 A third method is liquidation of a company
through the sale of productive assets to the highest bidder and
junking the remains.3 Variations and combinations of these
methods are also used.4 For instance, smaller state enterprises,
like retail shops or restaurants, may be sold off through an auc-
tion system to the general public. Medium size companies with
proven or potential profitability could be made available for
joint ventures and voucher system privatization. Some large
scale companies could be transformed through liquidation and
others through voucher system privatization.
I. REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCCESSFUL PRVATIZATION
There are a number of elements that must be in place
before the privatization process may be successfully completed.
Some may be legislated, some are dependent on external fac-
tors, and others are completely intangible. Generally, the crite-
1. See MICHAEL A. GOLDSTEIN & N. BuLENT GULTEKIN, CENTRAL EUROPEAN PRIvA-
TIZATION: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 22-29 (June 28, 1991) (unpublished draft) (on file
with the Fordham International Law Journal) (describing voucher system privatization as
one of three methods of privatization).
2. See MORRIS MENDELSON, STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR PRIVATIZING CENTRAL-
EASTERN EUROPE 19-20 (Weiss Center for Int'l Fin. Research, The Wharton School,
Univ. of Penn. 1991). Althoughjoint venture privatization has frequently been used in
Central and Eastern Europe, there is fundamental conflict of ideologies between state
and joint venture partners. Id. The advantage of this approach from the private sector
perspective is that it enables a company to establish itself in new markets. Id.
3. Ben Slay, Poland: The Role of Managers in Privatization, 2 RAoO FREE EUR./RL
RES. REP., No. 12, Mar. 19, 1993, at 53-54. Liquidation privatization occurs when the
physical assets of state enterprises are privatized in their entirety or through the piece-
meal sale of plants and equipment. Id. Some argue that liquidation privatization has
advantages over voucher system privatization because it relies upon already existing
markets for physical assets for valuation of the property while the voucher system re-
quires determining the value of the shares in the companies. Id.
4. Id. In Poland, for example, liquidation privatization and a voucher system form
part of the privatization plan. Id.
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ria for success fall into two overlapping categories: institutional
environment and market functions.
A. Institutional Environment
Privatization requires an appropriate legal and political
framework to provide the skeleton of a market economy.5 With-
out a complete and proper institutional environment, the foun-
dation of the market will be shaky, resulting in failures and non-
competitive situations. Part of the goal of the institutional
framework is to create an environment conducive to entry and
exit of resources, a necessary step to achieve efficient allocation
of resources. The order of implementation of reform measures
should be based on promoting entry of efficient producers and
exit of inefficient producers, who hold scarce resources better
used by new entrants. Five key aspects of the institutional envi-
ronment are vital for the implementation of a privatization pro-
gram: property rights, contract law, entry and exit laws, securi-
ties laws, and political stability.
. 1. Property Rights
Property rights,6 or the right to exercise ownership of prop-
erty, furnish incentives to use resources efficiently.7 A legal sys-
tem that protects and enforces property rights will allow owners
of property to "have confidence that they will obtain returns
5. See PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WiLLiAM D. NoRDHAus, ECONOMICS 37 (14th ed. 1992)
(defining markets and market economies). According to Samuelson and Nordhaus,
[a] market is a mechanism by which buyers and sellers of a commodity interact
to determine its price and quantity.
In a market system, everything has a price, which is the value of the good
in terms of money. Prices represent the terms on which people and firms
voluntarily exchange different commodities.
Id. A problem with the economies of the former Communist bloc is that prices were set
by the government and exchanges were not voluntary. Id. The real value of goods was
distorted and resources were allocated based on fictitious values. Id.
6. WERNER Z. HIRSCH, LAw AND ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYsis 24-25 (2d
ed. 1988). According to Hirsch,
[t]he concept of property rights relates to the set of privileges and responsibili-
ties accorded to a person in relation to the owning of property .... The right
to property is the power to exclude others from or give them access to a bene-
fit or use of the particular object."
Id.
7. Id. at 25.
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from the use of property."' In the search for greater returns,
owners will put their property to its most productive use and
therefore create greater efficiency in the economy as a whole.
In order to promote efficiency, property rights must apply
to real property, movable property, and intellectual property.
Rents from all three contribute to the economy and protection
of these rents encourages private investment. In the effort to
encourage private parties, governments must consider the need
to attract foreign as well as domestic investment. While domestic
producers may be willing to invest even while property rights are
unclear based on their sense of comfort in the country, large
scale foreign investors will be wary of large investments in an
insecure environment.
Property law forms part of the foundation of free market
economies and is the first step in economic reform. Private own-
ership creates the right to collect the rents from property and
the responsibility to assume the losses; it takes government out
of the mix and relieves it of its responsibility to finance produ-
cers who should be out of business.
2. Contract Law
Contract law is another criteria for privatization and stems
from property rights.9 The principles of contract law, such as
"freedom of contract," aid in the privatization process, stating
that voluntary exchange should be freely permitted in order to
maximize value 10 and imposes sanctions for reneging on one's
promise to perform.1' Where performance is over an extended
period of time, there is uncertainty regarding the conditions
under which performance will occur such that a party's initial
cost-benefit analysis may be inapplicable. 12 Contract law en-
forces the allocation of risk initially agreed to by the parties.'"
The underlying assumption is that the parties will negotiate for
8. Id.
9. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRAcr
LAW 7 (1979) (stating that freedom of contract implies system of transferable property
rights) [hereinafter KRONMAN & POSNER].
10. Id. at 2; see HIRSCH, supra note 6, at 129 (defining contract as "a promissory
agreement for future exchange, freely and voluntarily arrived at").
11. KRONMAN & POSNER, supra note 9, at 4.
12. Id.
13.. Id.
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the most efficient risk allocation. Over time, firms that are un-
able to risk-allocate while maximizing profits will be driven out
of business, leaving the more efficient survivors. The creation
and protection of contract rights contributes to a stable environ-
ment, which will decrease the risks of economic activity, thereby
encouraging actors to enter the marketplace.
3. Entry and Exit Laws: Competition and Bankruptcy
To create a healthy economy, assets must be encouraged to
enter and exit industries so that they are put to their most pro-
ductive use. Competition laws are needed to promote new en-
try. Bankruptcy laws are needed to shift resources from weak
competitors to strong ones.
Privatization will serve little purpose if state-owned monopo-
lies are simply turned into private monopolies that erect barriers
to entry and create deadweight loss. Therefore, a clear set of
competition laws must be enacted to ensure that new firms enter
a market where they have a chance to succeed.
Competition considerations should be part of the privatiza-
tion decision. To allow anticompetitive privatizations to occur
and to attempt to undo them later is far more complicated than
to address them initially. The issue in many countries is whether
to privatize quickly versus efficiently.14 Some tension is inherent
between the goals of the country's privatization agency, which
attempts to sell an attractive package to foreign investors imme-
diately, and those of the competition agency,' which attempts to
create long-term efficiencies.
In many cases, state monopolies have to be fragmented into
several different competing firms. The vertical relationships that
are so common in command economies must be examined
closely. If these relationships give firms with market power' 5 an
14. See, e.g., Making It Work, ECONOMIST, Mar. 13, 1993, at 93 (opining that Czech
officials are correct in deciding to privatize state property quickly, rather than wait until
all details of market economy are decided). Comparatively, the Polish and Hungarian
privatization programs have sold off a relatively small number of state enterprises. Id.
15. See Re Continental Can Co. Inc., J.O. L7/25 (1972), [1972] 11 C.M.LR. DlI
(discussing monopoly power in European Community). In the European Community,
market power is seen in the prohibition against abuse of a dominant position in Article
86 of the 1957 Treaty of Rome. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Commu-
nity, Mar. 25, 1957, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-1I), 298 U.N.T.S. 3 (1958).
Dominant position is defined by the Commission as follows:
Undertakings are in a dominant position when they have the power to behave
19931
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advantage in procuring supplies or distributing goods thereby
preempting entry by competitors, these relationships may need
to be undone.
Competition laws will also guard against bid-rigging in auc-
tions. When a state decides to sell a company, it also should reap
the benefits of competition law. Bid-rigging must be prohibited
to ensure that the state will receive the highest possible price for
the company it is selling. Getting the best price for state compa-
nies will not only benefit state coffers, it will also send a signal to
a public holding vouchers in recently privatized enterprises that
their assets are valuable, thereby encouraging consumer confi-
dence in the economy.
Bankruptcy laws are also part of the picture. Uncompetitive
players using scarce resources need an organized means of exit-
ing the marketplace. The justified fear of policy-makers in for-
mer communist countries, however, is that massive bankruptcies
will occur upon passage of bankruptcy legislation. Such an event
would surely work to unhinge politicians coaching their public
towards free markets.
4. Securities Legislation
Privatization schemes generally envision an important role
for nascent securities markets. Either through stock offerings or
mutual funds, private ownership of enterprises will come in
some form of security. However, without legislation regulating
independently, which puts them in a position to act without taking into ac-
count their competitors, purchasers or suppliers. That is the position when,
because of their share of the market, or of their share of the market combined
with the availability of technical knowledge, raw materials or capital, they have
the power to determine prices or to control production or distribution for a
significant part of the products in question. This power does not necessarily
have to derive from an absolute domination permitting the undertakings
which hold it to eliminate all will on the part of their economic partners, but it
is enough that they be strong enough as a whole to ensure to those undertak-
ings an overall independence of behaviour, even if there are differences in
intensity in their influence on the different partial markets.
Re Continental Can Co. Inc., J.O. L7/25, at 35, [1972] 11 C.M.L.R. at D27.
In the United States, market power is seen in the offense of monopolization under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act. See United States v. Grinell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966)
(discussing monopoly power in United States). Market power is the ability to raise
prices and restrict output profitably. The test for monopolization is "(1) the possession
of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or mainte-
nance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of
a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident." Id. at 570-71.
[Vol. 17:84
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the securities market, inefficiencies and abuses are likely to oc-
cur. Insider trading, overpricing, misrepresentation, and fraud
must be guarded against. Because the true value and financial
health of most enterprises is unknown, the inside information of
present and past state employees will be extremely valuable
when the distribution of ownership occurs. Misuse of this infor-
mation must be avoided.
5. Political Stability
There are several reasons why political stability is necessary
for successful privatization. First, stable governments, secure in
their power, can make privatization a top priority. When govern-
ments are shaky or change frequently, the focus becomes the
creation of a strong government over privatization. 16 When a
stable government is able to prioritize its economic reforms with-
out fear of upheaval, it gives programs like privatization a sense
of continuity and legitimacy. Reforms are allowed to develop
and flourish under the guidance of stable governments. The
continuity of reform eventually leads to economic stability as
plans are given enough time to work. Economic stability inspires
confidence. Privatization can work only if people are confident
that the market is stable and viable. Indeed, consumer confi-
dence is the key to any successful economy. Without comple-
mentary political stability, however, such confidence can be im-
possible to achieve.
B. Market Functions
Even after the legal and institutional framework is in place,
a number of intangible factors arise that are necessary for the
success of privatization. These functions represent integral com-
ponents of a successful free market, the ultimate goal of priva-
tization.
1. Information Flows
One of the primary characteristics of the perfectly competi-
16. See, e.g., Poland on a Detour, FIN. TIMEs, June 2, 1993, at 15 (quoting Hanna
Suchocka, Polish Prime Minister, stating that unless stable government is maintained, it
may be impossible to advance with economic reforms). Hanna Suchocka, Polish Prime
Minister, has been in office for 11 months. Id. Polish President Lech Walesa called for
general elections on September 19, 1993. Christopher Bobinski, Walesa Prunes Parties in
Poll, FIN. TIMES, June 3, 1993, at 2.
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tive market is the possession of perfect information. For exam-
ple, information is an extremely important consideration for a
securities market where share price, actual value, and company
performance are all used to reach bid and offer decisions. In
the newly-formed stock markets of Central and Eastern Europe,
however, the flow of information is limited. The actual value of
shares is difficult to determine as modern accounting' and audit-
ing systems need to be developed and implemented. The finan-
cial health of various companies will be hard to measure. Addi-
tionally, without securities laws, parties with accurate informa-
tion will have a distinctly unfair advantage relative to the general
public.
The government must promote information flows either by
providing incentives to private actors to assume this role or by
divulging such information itself. Official stock prices should be
announced and firms should submit public statements of profit
and loss. Evaluation of a firm's true worth will take time to de-
velop since such an evaluation requires a preexisting market
mechanism. Without a market in which prices can change to
reflect demand, investment in stocks may slow as shareholders
become unwilling to trade due to poor information.
2. Capital Markets
Capital markets trade financial resources, including money
and stocks. Capital markets, along with financial intermediaries
such as banks, are institutions through which savings in the
economy are transferred to investors.1 7 While some countries
may have sufficient domestic resources for private citizens to
fund privatization, most will require foreign investment. Despite
its potential political impalatability, foreign capital can play a
positive role in joint ventures and liquidation. Protection of the
property rights of foreign investors is particularly important as
those investors will require more assurances of safety and protec-
tion of their assets than domestic investors, since they will be
facing more variables by virtue of investing in a foreign country.
3. Financial Intermediaries
A strong private banking system is a must for enduring
privatization. Private banks play several vital roles in market
17. SAMUELSON & NoRIHAus, supra note 5, at 731.
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economies. Commercial banks represent a medium for savings
and lending. A reliable source of loans is required to finance
private ventures and people need a place where they can save
and build upon earnings and profits. Without strong commer-
cial banks, the incentive for savings and financial support for
risk-taking does not exist. Furthermore, money market mutual
funds and investment banks are needed to handle the securities
market and to facilitate the buying and selling of publicly owned
companies.
II. THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND SLOVAKIA
Until July 1992, privatization efforts of the former Czech
and Slovak Federal Republic ("CSFR") were progressing with rel-
ative ease.'" Employing several methods of ownership transfer,
the Czechoslovak government created a program that made sig-
nificant progress towards placing enterprise ownership into pri-
vate hands. The decision to divide the CSFR into the Czech Re-
public and Slovakia, however, has created serious obstacles to
the successful completion of the project.
A. Privatization Efforts
The "small privatisation" law, presented to the Czechoslovak
Federal Assembly on October 25, 1990, provided a process for
the auctioning off of local shops and enterprises.19 It granted the
Czech and Slovak Ministries for State Property Control and its
Privatization2" the authority to conduct public auctions of enter-
prises not contested under the Restitution Law, which allows de-
scendants of pre-war property owners to file claims to regain
ownership.2 Over 10,000 enterprises were privatized through
18. See Czechoslovakia Takes Further Steps to Privatize Ownership, Xinhua General News
Service, Oct. 2, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES File (discussing efforts to
privatize).
19. Czechoslovak Draft 'Small Ptivatisation' Law, in U.S. DEPT. OF COM. NAT'L TECH.
INFO. SERV., CENTRAL AND EAsTERN EUROPEAN LEGAL TEXTS, (Nov. 7, 1990), available in
LEXIS, World Library, EELEG File.
20. Id. Under the republic structure of the former Czech and Slovak Federal Re-
public [hereinafter CSFR], each republic. had parallel agencies which then fell under
the jurisdiction of a federal agency. Id.
21. Another Law for Crucial Economic Reform Passed, CTK Nat'l News Wire, Feb. 20,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES File [hereinafter Another Law].
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this system of public auctions. 22
A plan for privatizing larger companies was created by the
"large privatization" law of February 27, 1991,23 which had juris-
diction over approximately 4000 firms.2'4 Although firm manag-
ers were asked to submit plans for the privatization of their own
enterprises, the republic and federal Privatization Ministries re-
tained the final say with regard to which plans were enacted.25
Most large firms were privatized through a coupon voucher
method authored by the Federal Ministry of Finance and admin-
istered at the republic level by the Czech and Slovak Privatiza-
tion Ministries.26 The plan was an effort to transfer ownership of
large enterprises to a wide array of Czechoslovak citizens and to
provide the widest possible dispersion of assets. Voucher cou-
pon booklets containing points for bidding on shares in state
firms and costing the equivalent of about one week's salary went
on sale on October 1, 1991.27 Approximately 8.5 million of the
country's 15 million eligible citizens participated in the pro-
gram.28
Initially, the government's plan engendered little public re-
sponse, perhaps because most Czechoslovaks had no experience
evaluating stocks and playing the market. Public interest greatly
increased, however, when a number of private investment funds
offered to redeem vouchers at a price ten to fifty times higher
than their cost.29 The 437 investment funds soon attained con-
trol of 75% of all coupons; the twelve biggest funds gained "40%
of the vouchers distributed for the first wave of privatization."3 °
The response to the funds thus led to an unexpected concentra-
tion of privatized assets, and, as a result, concern about anticom-
22. International Congress on Investment in Czechoslovakia Opens, CTK Nat'l News
Wire, Feb. 20, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES File.
23. See Another Law, supra note 21.
24. See Bruce A. Mann, Pivatization in the Czech Republic, 48 Bus. LAw. 963 (May
1993) (discussing privatization of larger companies).
25. Another Law, supra note 21.
26. Ministry Reports Results of Coupon Privatization, CTK Nat'l News Wire, June 26,
1992; see B.G., Voucher Privatization Bidding Starts May 18, PRAGUE POST, Apr. 1992, at 1,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES File.
27. John C. Coffee Jr., The Privatization of Eastern Europe, N.Y. L.J., July 23, 1993,
Corporate Update, at 5.
28. Czechoslovakia: Post Election Split Threatens Privatization Scheme, Int'l Press Ser-
vice, July 31, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES File.
29. Making It Work, supra note 14, at 90.
30. Id.
[Vol. 17:84
PRIVATIZATION TEST
petitive behavior. Addressing this fear, the Federal Assembly
passed a Law on Investment Funds and Investment Companies,
which prohibits a single fund from owning more than 20% of
any company's stock.3'
Some analysts predict that many of the funds will not sur-
vive. They suggest that funds that have invested in a large
number of companies will find themselves overextended and un-
able to provide adequate guidance to the firms they control.3 2 A
number of the funds are already experiencing financial diffi-
culty. Their problems are unlikely to improve before share-trad-
ing begins allowing the funds to raise money to meet their ex-
penses.33 Currently, however, trading is not expected to begin
until a computerized system is developed.34
The first wave of coupon privatization, five rounds of which
took place in the former CSFR from May 1992 to January 1993,
involved property worth U.S.$10 billion; almost 1500 firms were
transferred to the public. 35 The leader of the country's eco-
nomic reforms, former Finance Minister Vaclav Klaus, desig-
nated 1992 as the "year of privatization" in the CSFR. However,
the country's division has derailed the progress of ownership
transformation. Led by officials of the Movement for a Demo-
cratic Slovakia, Slovak legislators declared Slovak sovereignty on
31. See generally Foreign Investors Access to Stock Markets Could be Limited, FIN. TIMES,
LTD., FIN. E. EUR., May 8, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, FINEUR File (discuss-
ing general implications of law).
32. See Making It Work, supra note 14, at 90 (discussing obstacles of investment
funds and predicting slow privatization in Czech Republic).
33. Id. With the funds' chances of success so dismal, some analysts predict that
foreign investors with greater capital and expertise, and banks will increase their roles
in the newly privatized economy. Id.
The result, many believe, will be a financial structure for the Czech Republic
that is like Germany's: banks will be owners, creditors, directors and advisers
to big companies. The arrangement should suit a country where capital and
managerial talent is scarce. Yet the system is unlikely to work as well as Ger-
many's for a long time, if ever [due to, inter alia, Czech banks' lack of exper-
tise].
Id. at 93.
34. Id.
35. Ministry Reports Results of Coupon Peivatization, CTSK Nat'l News Wire, June 26,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES File. Almost 35% of the total was paid
for property in Slovakia; the rest was for property in the Czech Republic. Daily Report
of April 19, 1993, CTK Wire Report, April 14, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
WIRES File.
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July 17, 1992.6 Federal President Vaclav Havel resigned the
same day.3 7  On July 23, 1992, Klaus, now Prime Minister of the
Czech Republic, agreed with Slovak leader Vladimir Meciar on a
plan, effective January 1, 1993, to divide the country into two
separate states.3 8  The plan included a large number of treaties
and agreements defining post-split relations between the Czech
Republic and Slovakia,39 yet, despite these attempts at a smooth
transition, the division has resulted in a setback for privatization
in the two republics,
1. Czech Republic
Considering it more important to privatize state property
quickly than to finalize all the details of a market economy,40 the
government of the Czech Republic intends to proceed with the
scheduled second wave of privatization. Privatization Minister
Jiri Skalicky recently announced that this wave will take place at
the end of 1993.41 It is expected to involve property worth about
U.S.$17 billion42 and some 2100 enterprises.43 Most of the prop-
erty will be privatized through direct sales to foreign investors.44
Some property will be sold through the voucher method, with
coupon books available for purchase in the summer of 1993.11
The Czech Coupon Privatization Center planned to start
transferring to investors the Czech enterprise shares that they
36. Mary Battiata, Havel Quits as Czechoslovak President, WAsH. Posr, July 18, 1992, at
Al.
37. Id.
38. See Mary Battiata, Czech, Slovak Leaders Agree on Plan to Split Their Federation,
WAsH. PosT, July 24, 1992, at A30; Jiri Pehe, Czech-Slovak Relations Deteriorate, 2 RADIo
FREE EuR./RL REs. REP., No. 18, Apr. 30, 1993, at 1.
39. See Pehe, supra note 38, at 1 (discussing treaties and agreements and lack of
resolution of issues). Some of these agreements and treaties addressed the division of
federal assets. Id. Many issues, however, were left unresolved. Id.
40. See Making It Work, supra note 14, at 93 (discussing privatization in Czech Re-
public).
41. Patrick Blum, Choice of Markets As Czechs Distribute Shares, Privatisation Int'l, No.
57, June 1993 [hereinafter Choice of Markets], available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES
File.
42. See Second Coupon Privatization Wave Outlined, translated in FBIS-EEU-93-084,
May 4, 1993, at 5.
43. See Choice of Markets, supra note 41 (discussing second wave of privatization).
44. Id.
45. Skalicky: Privatization Fastest in Czech Republic, translated in FBIS-EEU-93-079,
Apr. 27, 1993, at 21. Some delays in approving projects for privatization have been
caused by "the poor state of property ownership records and insufficiently researched
materials for environmental auditing." Id.
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acquired during the first wave of coupon privatization in late
May 1993.46 With this decision, the government canceled its de-
cision of March 17, 1993, to postpone distribution of shares to
Slovak investors.47
Chairman of the Czech Fund of National Property, Tomas
Jezek, acknowledged that distribution could be stalled by the dif-
ficulty in identifying whether shareholders are Czech or Slovak
since the computer database used in managing the coupon
scheme was created before the country split.'
2. Slovakia
Many Slovaks felt that their economic situation was ignored
in the rush to sell off property.49 Prime Minister Meciar has ac-
knowledged these concerns by maintaining that, although the
process of privatization is important, it must be aimed at ensur-
ing growth and not at getting the .highest possible prices for the
privatized facilities. 50
On April 22, 1993, Prime Minister Meciar reiterated his gov-
ernment's support for continuing the privatization process,
although at a slower pace and with different methods than in the
Czech Republic. In June 1993, Privatization Minister Lubomir
Dolgos resigned and Prime Minister Meciar has since assumed
direct control over privatization."1 In the second wave of priva-
tization, scheduled for late 1993, priority is to be given to the use
of public tenders, public auctions, and direct sales, although
some shares will be distributed through coupon privatization.52
According to the former Slovak Privatization Minister Dolgos,
46. Privatization Shares Distribution to Start, translated in FBIS-EEU-93-093, May 17,
1993, at 9.
47. Id. This decision was made in reaction to the Slovak delay in former federal
property division. Id.
48. See Pehe, supra note 38, at 2.
49. Robert Mclean & Laura Pitter, Czechoslovakia: Post-Election Split Threatens Priva-
tization Scheme Int'l Press Serv., July 3, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES
File.
50. See Meciar Outlines Republic's Policy in Speech, translated in FBIS-EEU-93-038, Mar.
1, 1993, at 14.
51. Slovak Paiiiament Backs Government Economic Programme, The Reuter Asia-Pac.
Bus. Rep., Apr. 26, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES File; Ex-Slovak
Privatisation Minister Leaving Ruling Party, The Reuter Eur. Bus. Rep., June 23, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, REUTER File.
52. See Ministers Outline Privatization Plans, translated in FBIS-EEU-93-041, Mar. 4,
1993, at 12.
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the coupon method has been pushed into the background be-
cause it is inefficient.5" Former Minister Dolgos acknowledged
the country's slow privatization pace. 54 He fears that govern-
ment delay is likely to stall the second wave of privatization, dur-
ing which property valued at over U.S.$8 million is scheduled to
be sold.55
B. Institutional Environment: Czech Republic and Slovakia
1. Property Rights
Under the CSFR's socialist regime, state ownership enjoyed
precedence over private ownership. In recent years, however,
the constitution was amended to eliminate this division.56 Simi-
larly, the Civil Code of the CSFR, adopted in 1964, established a
hierarchical definition of property rights. 57  Twelve amend-
ments in 1992 did away with the hierarchical structure and
"equalized the legal status of state and private property."5
Before the country divided, a complete re-write of the Code was
planned 9;5  it is presently unclear whether the Czech Republic
and Slovakia will proceed on their own to make the changes en-
visioned before the CSFR's breakup.
Even with revisions to the Civil Code, elimination of the
state's monopoly on real property will be slow going. The resti-
tution process has proven to be a significant obstacle.6  Re-
turning lands to their pre-communist period owners will transfer
53. See Minister Discusses Privatization Problems, translated in FBIS-EEU-93-038, Mar.
1, 1993, at 16.
54. Slovak Privatization, in 4 Eur. & Former Soviet Telecom Rep., May 1, 1993, No.
5, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES File.
55. Dolgos Dissatisfied with Second Privatization Wave, translated in FBIS-EEU-93-073,
Apr. 19, 1993, at 15.
56. See CHERYL W. GRAY ET AL., THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR PRIVATE SECTOR Acrv-
rlY IN THE CZECH AND SLOVAK FEDERAL REPUBLIC 2-3 (Country Economics Dept., The
World Bank, Policy Research Working Papers No. WPS 1051, Nov. 1992) [hereinafter
LEGAL FRAMEWORK]. For example, the Constitutional Law on Fundamental Rights,
adopted in January 1991, gives all people the right to own and inherit property and
provides protection for all types of ownership rights. Id. at 3.
57. Id. at 3-4.
58. Id. at 4.
59. Id.
60. See Minister Discusses P~ivatization Problems, translated in FBIS-EEU-93-038, Mar.
1, 1993, at 18. The former Minister of Privatization, Lubomir Dolgos, noted that the
Ministry of Privatization has received 2,000 unsettled restitution claims and, but for
these, the Ministry would have progressed at least one-third further. Id.
[Vol. 17:84
PRIVATIZATION ,TEST
ownership of only some state-owned lands. Other real property
will still require privatization.6'
2. Contract Law,
Under the CSFR's socialist regime, freedom of contract was
limited. Beginning in 1990, however, a number of legal reforms
were directed at opening the system to increased private com-
mercial transactions and treating them as equal to public trans-
actions.62 The new Czechoslovak Commercial Code and the re-
vised Civil Code6 3 eliminated the concept of contract conclusion
based on commands "from above" and adopted, instead, a con-
cept of property based on liberal economics.64
The Civil Code of 1964 was extensively amended in 1991 to
equalize treatment of public and private transactions and to re-
instate market concepts of contract law.65 The new Commercial
Code provides legal rules governing commercial contracts in
such areas as commercial paper, secured transactions, and other
financial agreements.66
The true test of these legal changes will arise in judicial in-
terpretation of these Codes which will reflect the actual protec-
tions to be extended to private contractual agreements.
3. Entry and Exit Laws: Competition and Bankruptcy
The New Czecho-Slovak Competition Act was passed on Jan-
uary 30, 1991, and took effect March 31, 1991.6" By preventing
anti-competitive behavior, the law helps to ensure that the mar-
ket remains accessible to entry by new participants.6 The law
sets up a Federal Competition Office and a competition author-
61. See LEGAL FRAMEWORK, supra note 56, at 4 (describing privatization and restitu-
tion laws which govern process by which property is returned to previous owners).
62. Id. at 18.
63. Pavel Kalensky, Liberal Commercial Code, FIN. TIMES Bus. L. BwEF, Dec. 1991, at
10. The revised Civil Code came into effect onjanuary 1, 1992 and governs commercial
contracts. Id.
64. Id.
65. See LEGAL FRAMEWORK, supra note 56, at 19 (discussing 1991 amendments to
Civil Code and objectives).
66. Id.; see Kalensky, supra note 63, at 10 (discussing Civil Code and provisions for
financial agreements).
67. The New Czecho-Slovak Competition Act, No. 63, at 9 (Federal Competition
Office, Bratislava, Czecho-Slovakia 1991) [hereinafter Competition Act].
68. See id. at 9.
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ity in each of the republics.69 Since the country divided, compe-
tition policy has been implemented by the Czech Office of Eco-
nomic Competition and the Slovak Antimonopoly Office; the
Federal Office no longer exists. The competition agencies are
charged with preventing abuses of dominant position, oversee-
ing mergers, and promoting competitive concerns in the priva-
tization process.7 ° Fostering a competitive philosophy is diffi-
cult, however, in a country where the mindset has been other-
wise for so long. Unfortunately for the Czech and Slovak
competition authorities, what are now considered illegal cartel
agreements pursuant to the competition law used to be the
norm.7 1 Such cartel-like arrangements are common throughout
the food processing industry and most professional groups.72
The issue is whether the competition law is adequate to battle
the long-standing tradition of extreme monopolization without a
corresponding shift in attitudes.
Both the Czech and the Slovak competition authorities have
the power to review and reject privatization plans. This disap-
proval may then be appealed to the government.7- Foreign in-
vestors, who must work with the privatization ministry as well as
the competition office of each republic have complained of the
unclear review process where different groups "rarely speak with
one voice" and have requested the development of transparent
guidelines. 4 While guidelines have not been developed, the
Czech Government has responded to this type of complaint not-
ing that the Czech Office of Economic Competition ("CUHS")
has approved mergers in less than the three month term permit-
ted by law; has contributed to a flexible and speedy review pro-
cess; and has helped eliminate differences of opinion between
investors and the government. 75 A response to the Czech gov-
69. Id. at 31.
70. Id. at 31-32.
71. See Milan Ruzicka, New Rules Fail to Eliminate E. Europe Cartels, J. oF COM., Dec.
14, 1992, at IA.
72. Id.
73. The New Czecho-Slovak Competition Protection Act, art. 19(2), No. 63, at 41-
42 (Federal Competition Office, Bratislava, Czecho-Slovakia 1991). This law was devel-
oped when Czechoslovakia was still one country and is still in effect although each re-
public foresees enactment of a new competition law. Id.
74. Daniel Arbess, Survey of Privatisation in Eastern Europe, FIN. TIMEs, July 3, 1992,
at 7.
75. See Ivo Bezecny, Smooth Path to Czech Markets, EuL, Oct. 22-25, 1992, at 35. In
this same article Mr. Bezecny states that "[t]he basic philosophy of merger control is to
[Vol. 17:84
1993] PRIVATIZATION TEST 101
ernment noted that "[s]ince the end of September [1992, the
CUHS] has been more thoroughly integrated into the decision-
making process and has proved more successful than many peo-
ple expected."76
On April 22, 1993, the Czech Republic's bankruptcy law
came into effect after being delayed twice in 1992."7 Observers
predict that a wave of bankruptcies is imminent.78 The new law
is designed to prevent uncontrolled failures but to encourage
closing persistent loss-making enterprises 9.7  The law creates a
settlement period of three to six months during which creditors
and debtors may negotiate. A creditor's failure to comply with
statutory deadlines results in a waiver of claims.8 0
After several unsuccessful attempts, the Slovak government
recently adopted an amendment to the country's bankruptcy
law.8 ' The amended law is designed to give companies that
cannot pay their debts the chance to negotiate bankruptcy
contribute to market structures and to prevent or eliminate those which would endan-
ger economic competition." Id.
76. Chris Pommery, Clearcut Helpfor Sell-offs, EUR., Oct. 22-25, 1992, at 35. Despite
this favorable reply, Mr. Pommery also notes that the "full outlines of the government's
antimonopoly policy are... still being defined." Id.
On the issue of. trade liberalization, in a presentation given by the former CSFR
Czech Premier, Vaclav Klaus spoke to the role of trade liberalization in creating a com-
petitive marketplace. See Klaus Presents Czech Government Policy, translated in FBIS-EEU-
92-135,July 14, 1992, at 10 [hereinafter Klaus Presents Policy]. He stated that "[t]he gov-
ernment will thoroughly promote the policy of the continuing liberalization of foreign
trade, which is the most important condition for opening the Czech economy to for-
eign competition". Id.
77. Czech Bankruptcy Law Goes into Effect, 2 RAnio FREE EUR./RL REs. REP., No. 18,
Apr. 22, 1993, at 19 [hereinafter Czech Bankruptcy Law].
78. See Patrick Blum, Czechoslovak Divorce Costs Both Sides Dear, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 20,
1993, at 2. "According to conservative estimates, two-thirds of Czech industry is insol-
vent, including 80% of the country's biggest and most important producers." See Czech
Bankruptcy Law, supra note 77, at 19 (discussing increasing insolvency in Czech Repub-
lic and bankruptcy law).
79. See Anthony Robinson, Survey of Czech Republic, A Rich Diet of Adjustment, FIN.
TIMES, Mar. 24, 1993, at 2. The indebtedness of many state enterprises is partially ad-
dressed by the Consolidation Bank, which finances bad-debt write-offs with proceeds
from privatization. See Patrick Blum, Survey of Czech Republic, Changes Create Problems,
FIN. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1993, at 3 [hereinafter Changes Create Problems]; see also Klaus Presents
Policy, supra note 76, at 10 (quoting Klaus stating that Czech government advocated
'competition-driven management of loss-making, over-committed, and insolvent firms.
Unfortunately, bankruptcies of nonviable firms cannot be avoided, because they are
sometimes inevitable to make the economy healthier"). Id.
80. See Czech Bankruptcy Law, supra note 77, at 19. "[D]ebtors have 15 days to apply
for a three month protection period and creditors have 30 days to file claims...." Id.
81. See Parliament Approves Amendment to Bankruptcy Law, translated in FBIS-EEU-93-
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terms with creditors and aims at restoring them to a sound
financial basis.82
Fear that a large number of bankruptcies would be declared
immediately may have contributed to the amendment's repeated
failure to pass. According to Prime Minister Meciar, "seventy-
three percent of industrial enterprises and over fifty percent of
building enterprises demonstrate an inability [to pay their
debts].""' A former economics minister has said that 900 of 2000
major Slovak enterprises are currently threatened by bank-
ruptcy.8 4
4. Securities Legislation
The outcry against investment funds during the CSFR cou-
pon privatization process was so strong that the Federal Assem-
bly hurriedly drafted a securities law to mollify the public. The
law, passed on April 21, 1992, provides the legal basis for a secur-
ities exchange and defines the rules for participation. 5 It also
establishes an oversight council and a dispute resolution mecha-
nism.8 6 Once shares of newly privatized firms are transferred,
market participants will have legal protection from abuses by
traders and institutional investors.
Authority for regulating the stock exchanges in Prague and
Bratislava lies with the Czech and Slovak Finance Ministries.
Western experts are currently aiding those officials in imple-
menting the policies defined by the law. Until the trading of
shares gets underway, it will be difficult to judge the efficacy of
the law.
5. Political Stability
The federal Czechoslovak government proved stable
through June of 1992, paving the way for the successful passage
099, May 25, 1993, at 18 [hereinafter Amendment to Bankruptcy Law); see also Meciar Inter-
viewed on Bankruptcy Law, Economy, translated in FBIS-EEU-93-074, Apr. 20, 1993, at 16.
82. See Amendment to Bankruptcy Law, supra note 81, at 18 (discussing increasing
insolvency in Czech Republic and bankruptcy law).
83. See Meciar Stresses RestructuringEnterprises, translated in FBIS-EEU-93-094, May 18,
1993, at 9.
84. Jan Obrman, Internal Disputes Shake Slovak Government, 2 RADio FREE EUR./RL
RES. REP., No. 14, Apr. 2, 1993, at 16.
85. Law on Securities Market, HosPoci.AnSKE NovirsKv, May 13, 1992 (Czech.), re-
printed inJ.P.R.S.-EEU-92-079-5 54 (June 23, 1993) [hereinafter Law on Securities Market].
86. Id. at 57.
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of key legislation and the implementation of the voucher bid-
ding scheme. The country's division into separate states, how-
ever, has brought political and economic uncertainty and hin-
dered privatization efforts in both countries.
Despite assurances from both governments that problems
between them would be resolved, especially with regard to asset
division, observers, including some government officials, have
become increasingly pessimistic about their ability to compro-
mise.a7
Recent opinion polls show a high degree of public trust in
the government of Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus and President
Vaclav Havel;8 their ruling coalition 89 has gained considerable
public support since parliamentary elections were last held in
June 1992.90 The high approval rate may reflect the country's
relatively healthy economy.9 ' In contrast,' the opposition has
been plagued by internal disorganization and has consequently
proven ineffective in challenging or checking government ac-
tion.92
Slovakia lags significantly behind the Czech Republic in
terms of economic progress. Many citizens and politicians want
to slow the pace of reform until the economy can be stabilized.
The continued poor performance of Slovakia's economy has
caused the government's popularity to falter.93
Since the breakup of the CSFR, public support for Prime
Minister Meciar and his ruling party, the Movement for a Demo-
cratic Slovakia ("MDS"), has dropped significantly,94 despite
87. See Pehe, supra note 38, at 3 (discussing split of country into two states and
resulting tensions).
88. See Poll Shows Have4 Klaus Trusted by Majority, translated in FBIS-EEU-93-099,
May 25, 1993, at 12.
89. Jan Obrrnan, Czech Opposition Parties in Disarray, 2 R.nio FREE EUR./RL RES.
REP., No. 16, Apr. 16, 1993, at 1. The coalition consists of Klaus' Civic Democratic
Party, the Civic Democratic Alliance, the Christian Democratic Union-People's Party,
and the Christian Democratic Party. Id.
90. See id.
91. See Dan De Luce, Slovakia's Status New, But Old Issues Still Linger; Economy
flounders as Politicians Quarrel, WASH. PosT, Apr. 10, 1993, at A13 (stating that
"[u]nemployment [in the Czech Republic] is running at less than [three] percent, while
Slovakia's jobless rate stands at about 11 percent. After a precipitous two-year decline,
Czech productivity is beginning to stabilize."). Id.
92. See id.
93. Obrman, supra note 84, at 16.
94. See De Luce, supra note 91, at A13. "Since the demise of the Czechoslovak
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Meciar's efforts to strengthen his position." Meciar has also lost
leverage in the parliament. When the Slovak National Party pul-
led out of the government's informal coalition in March 1993, it
left the MDS "two votes short of a majority in the 150-member
parliament."9 6 For the time being, the MDS has rejected the
possibility of forming another coalition government.97
Against Meciar's wishes, Michal Kovac of the MDS was
elected President of Slovakia in February 1993; he is widely con-
sidered to be opposed to Meciar. Although Kovac's position is
largely ceremonial, analysts have wondered whether the increas-
ingly popular President might step in and attempt to influence
the direction of Meciar's government.9
The lack of unity within the ruling party threatens Slovakia's
political stability. An illustration of this discord is Meciar's an-
nouncement that there will be no second round of coupon
privatization; two of his ministers, however, maintain that the
process will begin during the summer of 1993. 91 The govern-
ment's disarray is further illustrated by the resignation of one
minister and the ousting of another.100 Several ministers have
been dismissed or have chosen to resign, including Privatization
Minister Dolgos. This has resulted in a growing public uncer-
tainty about the government's reforms. 1 1
C. Market Functions: Czech Republic and Slovakia
1. Information Flows
Information has not always been available to the investing
public. There is difficulty in adequately assessing the true value
of most Czechoslovak enterprises given the country's failure to
use Generally Accepted Accounting Standards for many years.
state, support for Meciar's ruling party has dropped in Slovak opinion polls from 30
percent to 24 percent." Id.
95. See Obrman, supra note 84, at 13 (predicting future bankruptcies).
96. De Luce, supra note 91, at A13.
97. See Alexander Picha, HZDS Rejects Call for Early Elections, translated in FBIS-EEU-
93-101, May 27, 1993, at 7.
98. See Obrman, supra note 84, at 17 (discussing relationship between Kovak and
Meciar).
99. Id.
100. See Patrick Blum, Slovak Leader Tightens Grip on His Party, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 30,
1993, at 4.
101. See id.; see also Bernd Debusmann, Czech-Slovak Gulf Widens, Reuters, Sept. 5,
1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, REuTER File.
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The lack of such knowledge forced investors during the first
wave of privatization to guess which firms might be profitable.
10 2
With the enormous number of firms being transferred to private
hands, government officials had relatively little time to analyze
privatization plans for individual firms.
10 3
The Czechoslovak government, however, made efforts to re-
spond to the widespread lack of information. The securities law
of April 1992 includes provisions requiring the publication of
financial data by stock. issuers.' 0 4 The lawalso requires price
quotes to be published at the end of every business day by ex-
change traders.0 . The provisions of the securities law are a posi-
tive step toward promoting information dissemination.
2. Capital Markets
Before the country broke up, the CSFR pursued foreign in-
vestment to attract needed capital. Privatization officials desig-
nated approximately fifty firms for sale to foreign companies,
and many others entered into joint ventures.'0 6 Firms such as
Philip Morris, Dow Chemical, Coca-Cola, and K-mart initiated in-
vestments amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars. 07 The
government has signed an investment treaty with the United
States.' 0 The country also passed tax legislation enabling for-
eign corporations to repatriate a portion of the profits that they
make in the country.' 9 The CSFR's commitment to reform, as
well as its relative stability, proved attractive to investors.
Although foreign investors could not invest directly in cou-
pon privatization, they have been able to buy shares on the sec-
ondary market. By the end of 1992, shares Worth almost
102. See Charles T. Powers, Czechoslovaks Start Bidding For a Piece of State Firms, L.A.
TIMES, May 19, 1992, at A4.
103. Id.
104. Law on Securities Market, supra note 85, pt. 4, § 23.
105. Id. pt. 5, § 25.
106. See Peter Martin, Privatization Stirs Controversy, REP. ON E. EUR., Oct. 4, 1991, at
7.
107. See Robert C. Toth, K-mart Buys Up a Dozen Department Stores in Czechoslovakia,
L.A. TimEs, May 8, 1992, at D12.
108. Donnie Radcliffe & Roxanne Roberts, Valav Havel Getting Down to Business;
At the White House Dinner, Czechoslovak's Labor of Love, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 1991, at BI.
109. Vaclav Klaus, Remarks at Overseas Private Investment Corporation Conference on In-
vestment in Czechoslavakia, Fed. News Service, Mar. 4, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, WIRES File.
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U.S.$260 million and property worth almost U.S.$150 million
had been sold to foreign investors.
a. Czech Republic
Before the CSFR disintegrated, the Czech Republic, with its
central location, skilled labor force, and low wages, received
close to 90% of the foreign investment coming into the coun-
try." 0 The country's breakup does not appear to have signifi-
cantly deterred the influx of capital: according to the Czech Na-
tional Bank, direct foreign investment in the Czech Republic in
the first quarter of 1993 amounted to U.S.$302 million, an in-
crease of almost 31% over the same period last year."' Cur-
rently, Germany holds the number one foreign investment posi-
tion, accounting for 32.2%, and the United States for 29.5%.112
Minor tax advantages are available for foreign investors. Prime
Minister Klaus' policy, however, is national, and advances equal
treatment for foreign investors; he maintains that the country is
attractive for investment without added incentives. 13
Although a number of foreign investment privatizations
have been proposed, inefficient government administration has
led to costly delays. 1 4 With the success of the coupon privatiza-
tion program, however, foreign investors can avoid the burden-
some official privatization process and buy shares or companies
directly from shareholders or from the electronic stock mar-
ket." The anticipated restructuring and development of the
country's industrial and infrastructural sectors present prime op-
110. See Anthony Robinson, Survey of Czech Republic, Ready To Go It Alone, FIN.
TIMES, Mar. 24, 1993, at I [hereinafter Ready To Go It Alone]; see also, Patrick Blum, Survey
of Czech Republic, Ideal Base for Exporters, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1993, at 3 [hereinafter Ideal
Base].
111. See Hana Piskova, First Quarter Foreign Investment Figures, HosPoDARSK NovNY,
May 13, 1993, at 11, translated in FBIS-EEU-93-094, May 18, 1993, at 8.
112. Id.
113. See Ideal Base, supra note 110, at 3 (discussing foreign investment).
114. Id. Foreign investment plans have been discarded for a number of reasons.
In March 1993, Mercedes-Benz abandoned its plans for a joint venture with the Avia
truck company because the Czechoslovak split made access to Eastern Europe more
difficult. See Blum, supra note 78, at 2 (discussing foreign investment). "Several other
large investments have either fallen through (Dow Chemicals), are being revised down-
wards (Siemens) or are locked in endless negotiations (Iveco/Fiat)." Id.
115. See Robinson, supra note 79, at 2 (discussing Consolidation Bank's attempts to
reduce indebtedness by using proceeds from privatization).
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portunities for foreign investment.1 16 The Czech Government
recently approved the placement of U.S. management into the
Tatra Koprivnice joint stock company, a car and truck pro-
ducer." 7 Although this firm is presently in financial trouble, it
was privatized via the voucher system. The receptivity of the
Czechs to foreign investment is exemplified by this transfer:
management will assume a key decision-making role rather than
an advisory one in Tatra's eleven-member Board of Directors."1
The breakup of the CSFR led to a great reduction of trade be-
tween the Czechs and the Slovaks. Traditionally, 25% of all
Czech exports went to Slovakia, and 40% of all Slovak exports
were shipped to the Czech Republic; experts predict inter-Re-
public trade could fall by 30% to 40% in 1993.119 With the initia-
tion of various new border and commerce laws between the two
countries, each nation was forced to pursue alternate markets to
maintain their trade equilibrium. Prior to the disintegration, in
1992, 70% of Czech and Slovak exports were destined for the
West, but further increases will be difficult as typical exports like
steel and textiles are subject to increasing Western protection-
ism.' 2° On the whole, however, the Czech Republic has fared
quite well following the break up. For example, overall growth
of capital invested in the form of foreign direct investment into
the Czech Republic reached 53.7 billion korunas (U.S.$1.868 bil-
lion) .121
b. Slovakia
Slovakia no longer receives the subsidies it was accustomed
to getting from the Czech Republic.122 According to representa-
tives from Western Banks, foreign currency reserves in the
Slovak National Bank have fallen to "unacceptably low levels." 123
The country is in need of capital, but its political instability
116. See id.
117. See US. Management Stake in Tatra Approved, PRAGUE GrI, Apr. 28, 1993, trans-
lated in FBIS-EEU-93-084, May 4, 1993, at 4.
118. Id.
119. See Blum, supra note 78, at 2 (discussing insolvency in Czech Republic).
120. Id.
121. See id.
122. See Robinson, supra note 79, at 2 (discussing Consolidation Bank's attempts to
reduce indebtedness by using proceeds from privatization).
123. Dan De Luce, Slovakia's Status New, But Old Issues Linger; Economy Lingers as
Politicians Quarrel, WASH. Posr, Apr. 10, 1993, at A13.
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threatens foreign investment. 12 4
According to Former Privatization Minister Dolgos, the
Slovak government has been taking affirmative steps to attract
foreign' capital. For example, in February 1993, the government
hosted an international investors' conference on doing business
in independent Slovakia. 25 At that conference, Slovak officials
emphasized that domestic and foreign parties would be given
equal consideration in the privatization process.1 26 Further-
more, the country recently introduced major tax incentives for
foreign investment. 12 7 Similarly,, enterprises worth U.S.$490 mil-
lion have been earmarked for sale to foreign investors.' 28
-3. Financial Intermediaries
On December 20, 1991, the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly
passed legislation creating the State Bank and establishing regu-
lations for private banks. 2 9 Several banks were sold during the
first round of coupon privatization; others merged with foreign
banks, gaining needed capital in the process. Many foreign
banks have branches in the CSFR, and most investment banking
is handled by them. The framework for a good banking system
is now present: commercial banks, investment banks, and a cen-
tral bank all have a legal presence in the country.13 0
Twin stock exchanges linked by computer were established
in the republic capitals, Prague and Bratislava, to trade part of
the shares; the remainder were to be traded over-the-counter by
investment banks.' 3'
124. SeeJan Obrman, Internal Disputes Shake Slovak Government, 2 RADIo FREE EUR./
RL Rs. REP., No. 14, Apr. 2, 1993, at 17.
125. See Minister Discusses Privatization Problems, translated in FBIS-EEU-93-038, Mar.
1, 1993, at 17.
. 126. See Minister Outlines Privatization Plans, translated in FBIS-EEU-93-041, Mar. 4,
1993, at 13.
127. See Blum, supra note 78, at 2 (discussing tax incentives to reduce insolvency in
Czech Republic).
128. See Minister Kubecka Outlines Economic Measures, FBIS-EEU-93-095. May 19,
1993, at 12.
129. Act of Dec. 20, 1991 on Banks (Czech and Slovak Fed. Rep.) (English transla-
tion on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
130. Changes Create Problems, supra note 79, at 3.
131. John Mastrini, Prague and Bratislava Exchanges Await Action, Reuter Asia-Pacific
Bus. Rep., Apr. 28, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES File.
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a. Czech Republic
The Czech banking market has been expanding rapidly; ap-
proximately seventy Czech and foreign institutions are currently
operating."' The Czech Republic has made great strides in rev-
olutionizing its banking industry. It has created three different
types of banks. First, the recently renamed Czech National Bank
(previously the Central Bank) has been made responsible for fu-
ture currency development, and is wholly separate from com-
mercial banking activity. The second group consists of banks
which originated as state-owned intermediaries but later broke
off to become quasi-privatized, allowing some power to remain
with the state through substantial, but not majority, stakes in the
bank. Small, entirely privatized banks comprise the third group,
many of which developed from domestic sources, such as
Agrobanka Praha and its associated regional networks.'3 3 Under
the Communist regime, the banking system was burdened by a
huge number of bad debts, many of which resulted from loans to
state companies on government orders.13 1 To give the banks a
fresh start, the Czech government allowed them to transfer their
bad loans to the Consolidation Bank, which was expressly cre-
ated for this purpose. 3
To further spur economic growth and expedite the priva-
tization process, the Czech Republic also founded the Ces-
komorarska Guarantee and Development Bank, which assumes
loan guarantees for new clients and provides some state support
to high risk entrepreneurs to insure the much needed credit
they desperately seek.'3 6
b. Slovakia
According to Peter Mihok, Chairman of the Slovak Cham-
ber of Commerce and Industry, Slovak banks have been unable
132. Changes Create Problems, supra note 79, at 3.
133. See Banks Quickly Adapt, FIN. TimEs, THE CZECH REPUBLIC,Jan. 11, 1993 [here-
inafter Banks Adapt Quickly].
134. Changes Create Problems, supra note 79, at 3.
135. See id. "The hope is that the Consolidation Bank will be able to get some of
the loans repaid, and sell some of the bad debt on the market. The rest will have to be
repaid by the National Property Fund, an institution established to handle the privatiza-
tion process .... " Id. "[T ] he Consolidation Banks- [are] special institutions under the
administration of the Ministry of Finance, which, in turn, oversees long-term redemp-
tion." Banks Adapt Quickly, supra note 133.
136. See Banks Adapt Quickly, supra note 133 (discussing Consolidation Bank).
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to issue credit since October of 1992.137 The banks have no
funds to loan; even if they did, interest rates would be between
24% and 26%.138 The Slovak Foreign Ministry initiated its push
for private investment by guaranteeing "up to 75% of commer-
cial bank credits, plus grants covering up to 75% of interest pay-
ments ... "139 This push followed efforts by the Slovenska
Zarucna Banka (Slovak Guarantee Bank), which has traditionally
aided small and medium sized businesses engaged in foreign
and domestic tourism and travel. In 1992, Slovenska Zarucna
Banka guaranteed 289.4 million korunas of credits, supported
green credits (a framework which guarantees 538.3 million
korunas for 316 agricultural groups), and provided grants within
development programs devised by the government of
Slovakia.1 41
III. POLAND
The Polish privatization program has been characterized by
changes in policy and shifts in emphasis. The political divisions
that have plagued Poland since the overthrow of the Commu-
nists have stymied privatization reforms.
A. Privatization Laws
The Sejm, the Polish Parliament, passed Poland's first priva-
tization law on July 13, 1990.141 It established plans for con-
verting all state-owned enterprises into joint-stock companies
owned entirely by the State Treasury. Privatization was to occur
in two fashions: sale of stock to third parties and liquidation.
The law called for economic analyses to be performed on enter-
prises sold through stock offerings, and it included provisions on
preferential treatment for employees buying shares, payment of
outstanding financial obligations, and repatriation of foreign
capital. It also called for the distribution of "privatization cou-
pons" to all Polish citizens free of charge, which could then be
137. See No Credit Available From Banks Since October, FBIS-EEU-93-046, Mar. 11,
1993, at 18-19.
138. See id. at 19.
139. See Increase in Illegal Border Crossings Noted, translated in FBIS-EEU-93-095, May
19, 1993, at 12.
140. Id.
141. See Law on Privatization of State Enterprises, RZECZPOSPOLITA, July 23, 1990, at 3-
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exchanged for shares. 4 ' Liquidation simply meant dissolving
unprofitable companies and selling or leasing their valuable as-
sets to third parties. Workers' councils received permission to
appeal any decision to liquidate. Another law passed on the
same date created the Ministry for Ownership Transformation
(or Privatization Ministry) to oversee the conversion and sale of
Polish firms.
Unlike the Czechoslovak privatization laws, the Polish law
contained few specifics. It identified general objectives for the
program but contained few details on the execution of the plan.
In December of 1990 the Polish government issued a document
outlining its strategy for privatization. 4 ' It split Polish compa-
nies into two categories: 500 large enterprises and 5500 small-to
medium-sized enterprises."' The plan envisioned substantial
growth in the latter category as large firms were fragmented into
individual components. The Polish strategy document reiter-
ated that sale of shares and liquidation were the two available
methods for privatizing firms. In addition, unlike the Czechoslo-
vak plan, which recognized the utility of selling small companies
in their entirety, the Polish plan left open the option of selling
shares of these enterprises to various parties. Because the com-
panies are small, the value of their stock is very low and having to
report to a diverse body of owners hampers the ability of manag-
ers to conduct business.
The Polish plan envisioned the creation of investment funds
to aid in the distribution of shares to Polish citizens. The initial
plan called for 30% of each company's stock to be given to the
public through these funds.'45 Another 20% would go to pen-
sion plans, also managed by investment funds.146 Ten percent
would be reserved for half-price sale to company workers and
another 10% would be sold to banks.1 47 The remaining 30%
would remain with the Treasury, which could sell the shares to
foreign investors or other Polish companies. 14 Western manag-
142. Id.
143. U.S. DEPT. OF COM. NAT'L TECH. INFO. SERV., CENTRAL AND EAsTERN EUROPE
LErAL TExTs, Polish Government Program for Privatization of the Polish Economy, 43 (Dec.
1990) [hereinafter Polish Government Program].
144. Id. at 45,
145. Id. at 46.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 47.
148. See Polish Government Program, supra note 143, at 47.
1993]
112 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL
ers were to be recruited to run the investment funds.
Privatization stalled in the first half of 1991. Disputes be-
tween management and workers, political upheavals, and the
general weakness of the Polish economy all combined to hamper
the pace of selling enterprises to private parties. By June 1991,
the Treasury had sold only thirteen companies. 49 The Privatiza-
tion Ministry, in an effort to refocus privatization reforms, un-
veiled a new mass privatization plan on June 27, 1991.150 The
plan called for the establishment of five to twenty National Man-
agement Funds ("NMFs") to run Polish businesses and distribute
shares to the people. 15 1 NMFs would control 60% of each Polish
enterprise, with employees getting 10% of the shares and the
government holding on to 30%.152 Each firm would be assigned
a "lead fund," which would receive 33% of the company's
stock.153 Lead funds would be responsible for the management
of enterprises and for preparing annual financial statements.
The remaining 27% of "fund stock" would be distributed among
the other NMFs. 154 Polish citizens would then receive vouchers
giving them a stake in the NMFs. 155
The Privatization Ministry originally planned for 400 firms
to participate in the initial execution of the mass privatization
scheme. 156 However, this number was slashed to 204 in the wake
of political turmoil at the end of 1991.157 Prime Minister Jan
Krzysztof Bielecki's party fared very poorly in October elections,
and Bielecki was replaced later in the year by Jan Olszewski.151
With a new prime minister came a new government and a
new privatization minister. Privatization slowed considerably as
the Olszewski government concentrated on consolidating its
power. By the end of 1991, Poland had privatized fewer than
149. See Steve Lohr, Poland to Privatize Industry by Giving Stake to All Adults, N.Y.
TIMES, June 28, 1991, at Al.
150. Id.
151. See supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text (discussing Polish privatization
plan).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.; see Lohr, supra note 149, at Al.
155. Id.
156. Id.; see Michael S. Lelyveld, Polish Privatization to Continue Despite Political Uncer-
tainties, J. OF COM., Nov. 26, 1991, at A12.
157. See id.
158. See Christopher Bobinski, Polish Coalition Talks Hit, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1991,
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thirty enterprises.159
Privatization regained momentum in March of 1992, when
the government announced plans to speed up the privatization
process. 160 The new program called for up to 600 companies to
be privatized by the end of 1992 through the mass privatization
scheme developed by the previous government. 1 1
Less than two weeks after the announcement to speed up
the process, the Polish government announced that the entire
program was in danger of insolvency. 6 2 To generate capital, the
Polish government began offering Polish companies for sale to
foreign investors. The Financial Times ran an advertisement pro-
moting the sale of 80% shares in twenty Polish companies. 163
Meanwhile, the mass privatization plan was put on hold yet
again. Only seven joint stock companies were privatized by mid-
1992.1'' June of 1992 was a month of political:chaos'in Poland
as the Olszewski government fell, and a government led by
Waldemar Pawlak never gained acceptance. Finally, on July 8,
Hanna Suchocka was named as Poland's new prime minister.1 65
This upheaval brought privatization to a halt as Polish leaders
were sidetracked while they attempted to form a lasting govern-
ment.
The push for privatization soon resumed under Prime Min-
ister'Hanna Suchocka and Privatization Minister Janusz Lewan-
dowski. With the support of the Coalition, a current union of
Polish Political Parties banded together to back the Mass Priva-
tization Program' Privatization was brought to the floor of the
Sejm for a vote where it was narrowly defeated on March 19,
1993.166 This setback was in major part due to the break in ranks
by Coalition members belonging to the Christian National
159. See Lelyveld, supra note 156, at A12 (presenting statistics on privatization).
160. Polish Government Speeds Up Privatization Program; Western Experts to Play Key Role,
2 EBRD WATCH, No. 8, Mar. 2, 1992, at 4.,
161. Id.
162. See Money Could Run Out, FIN. TIMES, FIN. E. EUR., Mar. 19, 1992, available in
LEXIS, World Library, FINEUR File.
163. Capital Privatization: Who's the Boss?, RZECZPOLPOLTrrA, No. 109, May 9, 1992, at
1. , ;
164. Last Six Months of Privatization Assessed, translated in FBIS-EEU-92-131, July 8,
1992, at 20.
165. See Walesa Accepts Suchocka Candidacy, Cabinet, translated in FBIS-EEU-92-132,
July 9, 1992, at 24.
166. See Louisa Vinton, Polish Coalition Digests Privatization Defeat, 2 SUPPLEMENT TO
THE RADIO FREE EUR./RL REs. REP., No. 14, Mar. 22, 1993, at 10.
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Union who voted against the legislation for fear that it provided
foreigners with too great an opportunity to acquire stock and
gain control of many vital Polish companies. Gambling on the
stability of the coalition government, Privatization Minister
Janusz Lewandowski threatened to resign if the legislation was
not passed upon resubmission.1 67
The legislation underwent modification, resulting in a two
stage, "pilot-like" privatization program. The first stage now con-
sists of a pilot process in which national investment funds will
assume control of 200 firms already prepared for the privatiza-
tion process. Most of these shares will be disbursed to pen-
sioners and public servants who lost benefits in 1991.169 The sec-
ond phase will include 600 giant, state-run businesses, whose
shares will be made available to all adult citizens for 5% of the
average monthly wage in Poland (down from 10%).170 In addi-
tion, employees of the affected firms will receive 15% of the
shares for free (up from 10%).171
Concurrently, President Lech Walesa espoused a privatiza-
tion proposal put forth by a political group known as the Net-
work. Under this plan, the government would distribute cou-
pons172 worth 300 million zlotys (U.S.$18,750) to each citizen to
be used to purchase shares of state assets to be sold off during
the privatization process. 173 After the success of the Mass Priva-
tization Program appeared likely, however, President Walesa lent
his support to this package although he truly preferred a na-
tional referendum on the entire issue of privatization. With the
new modifications, which were geared toward capturing pivotal
Post-Communist Democratic Left Alliance votes, the privatiza-
tion legislation was resubmitted to the Sejm. On April 30, 1993
the government-revised Mass Privatization Program was passed
167. Lewandowski Vows to Resign Unless Privatization Accepted, FBIS-EEU-93-079, Apr.
27, 1993, at 31.
168. Christopher Babinski, Polish Sell-OffPlans Revised, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1993, at
3.
169. See id.; see also Louisa Vinton, Polish Coalition Modifies Mass Privatization, Sup-
PLEMENT TO THE RADIO FREE EuR./RL RES. REP., No. 14, Apr. 3, 1993, at 15 [hereinafter
Polish Coalition].
170. Minister Lewandowski Views Privatization Plans, translated in FBIS-EEU-93-074,
Apr. 20, 1993, at 24; Polish Coalition, supra note 169, at 15.
171. Polish Coalition, supra note 169, at 15.
172. Id. The coupons are actually low interest loans repayable in 20 years. Id.
173. See Louisa Vinton, Builds Ptivatization Compromise, SUPPLEMENT TO THE RADIO
FREE EUR./RL REs. REP., No. 14, Mar. 29-Apr. 2, 1993, at 16.
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by a wide margin with several amendments, most notably one
"giving firms the right to refuse to take part in mass privatiza-
tion."1
74
To smooth the path for this imminent privatization, new
State Enterprise Laws are being pursued that would increase so-
cial safety nets for employees of state enterprises being priva-
tized, give employees more say in the running of such firms, and
allow enterprises to choose their method of privatization.175
Although the legislation must still be ratified by the Polish
Senate and President, implementation of the Mass Privatization
Program is underway with plans for the first stage being devised.
This process will not be free of obstacles, as the public is still
wary of giving control of Polish companies to foreign inves-
tors.
1 7 6
General parliamentary elections were held on September
19, 1993 and were won by the Democratic Left Alliance and the
Peasant Party.17" Both parties have roots in the old Communist
system. While President Walesa was hoping that the strides
made in privatization will serve as an impetus to the people of
Poland to "[m] aintain [their] support for the parties pledged to
continue the reform which is now showing its first fruits,"17 in
174. See Louisa Vinton, Polish Mass Privatization Passes, at Last, 2 RADIo FREE EUR./
RL REP., No. 18, Apr. 26-30, 1993, at 9. This amendment allowed for firms targeted for
privatization by the Ministry of Privatization to reject such offers, limiting the scope and
impact of the original legislation. Id.
175. See Sejm Reaction to State Enterprise Draft Laws, translated in FBIS-EEU-93-093,
May 17, 1993, at 22. Public support for privatization itself is still questionable. In 1989
and 1990, "spontaneous privatization" took place and several economic elites legally
privatized their way to enormous wealth; this resulted in "public outcry and develop-
ment of programs for state-controlled privatization." See Ben Slay, Poland: The Role of
Managers in Privatization, 2 RADIo FREE EUR./RL REs. REP., No. 12, Mar. 19, 1993, at 52.
The wish for managed privatization may indicate increased public support for the Mass
Privatization Program. The public still retains certain reservations concerning foreign
investment, but it appears they would favor regulated, state-run privatization to the "ex-
ploitative" privatization of the late 1980's. Id.
176. See Walesa Orders Suspension of Szczecin Privatization, translated in FBIS-EEU-93-
098, May 24, 1993, at 17. This concern was displayed in the suspension of the Szczecin
shipyard privatization by President Walesa due to worker protest. Id.
177. John Pomfret, Former Communists Take Strong Lead in Polish Elections, WASH.
POST, Sept. 20, 1993, at A12.
178. See Poland on a Detour, FIN. TIMES, June 2, 1993, at 17. President Walesa
viewed this as an opportunity to document the increased faith of the Polish public in
economic reform and in the path toward a market system, developing after a period of
a "Retreat to Tradition" immediately following the passage of the privatization legisla-
tion. See Stephen Engelberg, Polish Vote, Clear Slap at Reform, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 29, 1991,
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light of the recent results of September elections, reforms are
expected to continue, but at a slower pace.
B. Institutional Environment: Poland
1. Property Rights
Poland's real property rights reform' has lagged behind
legal reforms generally. 179 However, private ownership of land
during the previous socialist regime was the rule rather than the
exception,8 0 thereby making the transformation to private own-
ership of land easier than in other former communist countries.
Previously, ownership was divided into three types, listed here in
descending order from most protected to least protected: (1)
social ownership, which included ownership by the state, cooper-
atives, and social organizations; (2) personal property, which was
property used for personal consumption, but not for produc-
tion; (3) individual or private property or individual ownership
of means of production."8 These divisions were eliminated in
the Polish Constitution of 1989 and the Civil Code of 1990, but
have yet to be removed from other areas of law.'8 2
Before state-owned property can be privatized, ownership of
at A3 (stating that former Communists enjoyed second highest contingency in Parlia-
ment).
179. CHERYL W. GRAY ET AL., THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR PRIVATE SECrOR DEVELOP-
MENT IN A TRANSITIONAL ECONOMY. THE CASE OF POLAND 2-9, (Country Economics
Dept., The World Bank, Policy Research Working Papers No. WPS 800, Nov. 1991).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 3.
Under Polish socialist law, "social ownership" - including ownership by the
state, cooperatives, and social organizations - was the highest category of
ownership and was protected by the Constitution and the Civil and Criminal
Codes. Typically, such property included means of production, including, for
example, land, mineral resources, and public utilities. In contrast, property
used for personal consumption was individually owned and considered "per-
sonal property." Personal property could include, for example, one's dwelling
house but not a rental house, which was considered a means of production.
Finally, "individual - or private - property" was defined as the individual
ownership of means of production, a residue of presocialist economic relation-
ships founded on exploitation and expected to "wither away" over time. Indi-
vidual property received less constitutional protection than social or personal
property and was subject to heavy taxation and numerous limitations on use
and transfer.
Id. (footnote omitted).
182. Id. at 3-4.
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these lands"'3 has to be clearly determined. In 1989, specific
state agencies were identified as owners of land and state enter-
prises were permitted to become owners of the property upon
which they were located. In 1990, local governments were re-
established and the Act on Local Autonomy and its implement-
ing regulations assigned local governments revenue rights and
spending responsibilities for land which was transferred to them.
This state property can now be alienated to private investors. 8
Issues for complete privatization of real property still re-
main. Poland has been struggling with the issue of returning
land that was expropriated by the former regime to its original
owners. The transfer of land to local governments has been con-
fusing; it is unclear who is the owner of some state lands. A reg-
istry of land ownership does not yet exist. Regulations on land
use have yet to be developed and implemented. Foreign inves-
tors wishing to purchase land face certain domestic hostility.
2. Contract Law
Polish contract law is based on the Polish Civil Code of 1964
and subsequent amendments enacted in July 1990.185 The Po-
lish Civil Code of 1964 contained a distinction between contracts
involving the state and those involving private individuals.
186
The goal of the 1990 amendments was to provide a uniform sys-
tem of contract law; this goal has largely been achieved. 187 Over-
all, the Civil Code contains the core rules of contracting and re-
flects western practice. 18 8 Areas requiring updating include
rules regulating commercial leases, franchises and factor leasing;
commercial laws are contained in various codes and these may
need unification or updating; the Civil Code will likely need to
be harmonized with that of the European Community. 8 9 Issues
in the area of contract law will depend upon Polish interpreta-
tion of contract provisions.
183. See GRAY, supra note 179, at 2 (stating that lands referred to included Warsaw,
other urban land, state-enterprises land, and some agricultural land).
184. GRAY, supra note 179, at 4.
185. U stawa z dnia 23 kwietnia 1964 r.- Kodeks Cywilny [Civil Code], Ozlennik U
stawa (1964), as amended, Dziennik Ustawa (1990).
186. GRAY, supra note 179, at 20.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 21.
189. See GRAY, supra note 179, at 22 (discussing need to update commercial laws).
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3. Entry and Exit Laws: Competition and Bankruptcy
The Law on Counteracting Monopolistic Practices was
passed on February 24, 1990190 and the creation of the Polish
Antimonopoly Office ("AMO") followed two months later. The
Antimonopoly Act has two principal sections: prohibition of re-
strictive business practices and structural changes in the econ-
omy. 9 1
The President of the AMO, Anna Fornalczyk, noted that the
main role of her agency is the creation of competitive mar-
kets. 19 2 The agency does this by concentrating on demono-
polization, working on privatization, and promoting trade liber-
alization. 193 In the area of demonopolization, the AMO takes
into account efficiencies which might be gained from not break-
ing up the enterprise and weighs these against the lack of busi-
ness culture in Poland generally.'94 Although efficiencies are
part of the mix, the AMO considers "whether the benefits of put-
ting more managers on the line, where they must learn to fend
for themselves or fail, are outweighed by any efficiencies that
may be lost [through] division."' 95
The AMO has also been involved in the privatization pro-
cess. Formally, the AMO can veto any privatization proposal. 96
This power can often be too blunt an instrument to use in fine-
tuning a privatization plan. As a result the AMO has been issu-
ing conditional approvals to privatization plans.197 One example
of the success of the AMO in bringing competitive considera-
tions to the privatization decision is in the restructuring of the
Polish petroleum industry. The Office took the position that the
industry should be restructured prior to privatization. By 1996,
190. Law of Feb. 24, 1990 on Counteracting Monopolistic Practices (Pol.) [herein-
after Law on Counteracting Monopolistic Practices] (English translation on file with the
Fordham International Law Journal).
191. Id.
192. See Anna Fornalczyk, Remarks at the Fordham Corporate Law Institute Con-
ference on International Law & Policy, Competition Policy During Transformation of a
Centrally Planned Economy 7 (Oct. 23, 1992) (hereinafter Anna Fornalczyk].
193. See id. at 8-14.
194. See id. at 10.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 11.
197. See id. (stating that from 1990 through 1992, Antimonopoly Office disap-
proved privatization plans for only two firms, while it issued sixty conditional approv-
als).
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refineries will be separated; the state-owned monopoly distribu-
tion firm will be permitted to own only 25% to 40% of refinery
capacity and 40% of gas stations; foreign firms will be permitted
to buy gas stations; and the AMO will be involved in determining
which gas stations CPN may keep. 198
The AMO also fights against trade protectionism by ob-
jecting strongly to privatization proposals which incorporate
trade barriers which are not tied to "a specific, time-limited pro-
gram to restructure the industry and then leave it to face compe-
tition in the world market." 99 In its role as competition advo-
cate, the AMO has refused trade barriers on textiles and agricul-
tural products.2°
A bankruptcy law has been in existence in Poland since
1934 and was amended most recently in 1990.201 It provides gen-
eral procedures for liquidation and reorganization and is over-
seen by the tribunal of a local court.2 02 An investigation may be
initiated by the tribunal, the debtor, or a company's creditors on
the grounds of non-payment of debt.203 The case is accepted by
the tribunal only on the condition that the firm's assets suffi-
ciently cover procedural costs. 20 4 The tribunal reviews the value
of the company's assets and the creditor's claims and then deter-
mines how the debts will be paid or whether the company will be
liquidated. °5 In 1992, the law was amended again to provide
equal conditions in applying bankruptcy law to private and to
public enterprises and some of the restrictions on the transfer of
assets of a bankrupt state enterprise were removed.20 6
Few bankruptcy proceedings have been heard pursuant to
this law.2 0 7 The legacy of the former state-owned dinosaurs has
left most countries in Central and Eastern Europe with large
198. See id. at 12-13.
199. Id. at 13.
200. Id.
201. See GRAY, supra note 179, at 23 (discussing Polish bankruptcy law and amend-
ments).
202. Id.
203. Id at 23-24.
204. Id. at 24.
205. Id.
206. Telephone interview with Peter Ianachkov at World Bank (Wash., D.C. June
1993).
207. See CHERYL W. GRAY, supra note 179, at 24 (discussing ineffectiveness of bank-
ruptcy proceedings).
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numbers of bankrupt enterprises. These enterprises have a tra-
dition of vertical and horizontal relationships through which
they extend each other credit, or inter-enterprise debt. The
existence of inter-enterprise debt keeps many creditors from im-
posing bankruptcy proceedings on their debtors for fear that the
whole house of cards will tumble. The state must now determine
how to liquidate these holdings while maintaining consumer
confidence. Massive bankruptcies would surely undermine any
attempts at buoying public faith in the economy during a diffi-
cult transition period. Despite the political pressures to avoid
bankruptcy, a liquidation law is necessary where a voucher
scheme or a joint venture is not workable. It can also fill the
vacuum for bankruptcy proceedings in the shorter term priva-
tization process.
The privatization legislation of July 1990 allows for liquida-
tion privatization. Pursuant to this procedure, insolvent firms
can be declared bankrupt and their assets reallocated. Liquida-
tion provides a convenient way of privatizing relatively healthy
small and medium-sized firms.2 0 Additionally, firms view the
liquidation option as a viable one. In the fall of 1991, approxi-
mately twenty requests for liquidation arrived daily at the Minis-
try of Privatization and at the end of: December 1992, almost
62% of the firms undergoing privatization were taking the liqui-
dation route.2 °9
4. Securities Legislation
Poland has done a satisfactory job in developing a regulated
and protected securities market. The Warsaw stock exchange,
opened in 1991 and modeled after the Paris Bourse, was created
208. Ben Slay, Poland: The Role of Managers in Privatization, 2 RADio FREE EUR./RL
REs. REP., No. 2, Mar. 19, 1993, at 53-54. Of 1,055 firms scheduled for liquidation priva-
tization through February 1992, only 589 were classified as bankruptcies. Id.
209. Id. Almost 62% of the firms were actually 1,474 state enterprises of the 2,387
firms officially classified as undergoing privatization. Id. Of the 1,055 small and me-
dium-sized state enterprises undergoing liquidation proceedings in February 1992,
however, significant asset sales were registered in only 510 of these. Id.
Since 1990, 540 state sector businesses employing 180,000 people have been priva-
tized, most by Poland's most popular privatization device, liquidation. Many of these
privatized businesses were labor intensive rather than having high capital requirements.
See Christopher Bobinski, Much Lost Time Has To Be Made Up, FIN. TIMES, July 7, 1992
(Special Supplement). As to the question of capital versus labor intensive, consider
that 80% of all retail outlets in Poland have already undergone privatization, displaying
the relative ease of labor intensive industries to participate in privatization. Id.
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with the help of the French.21' The Sejm has passed laws regu-
lating investment funds and other financial intermediaries. 211 In
addition, the Poles have created a Securities Commission, an
oversight organization similar to the Securities and Exchange
Commission in the United States.2 2 Currently, there is little
business for the exchange to conduct. With the impending rati-
fication of the mass privatization legislation, however, the Polish
securities market will play an important role in the privatization
process of Polish industries. With the rise in activity, the Polish
Securities Commission will need to guard against insider trading
by developing laws specifically outlining appropriate and inap-
propriate behavior for the national investment funds as well as
individual investors.
5. Political Stability
Since the first post-Communist government was elected in
1990, there have been five Polish prime ministers: -Tadeusz
Mazowiecki, Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, Jan Olszewski, Waldemar
Pawlak, and Hanna Suchocka. There are currently twenty-nine
political parties represented in the Sejm, requiring government
creation through negotiation and coalitions. 215 A casualty of Po-
lish political turmoil has been the pace of economic reform.
The strict measures taken during the "shock therapy" era of re-
form in early 1990 had until recently been relaxed considerably
due to public pressure. Upon the creation of the current seven-
party coalition government, serious economic restructuring re-
turned to the forefront. This rejuvenation of reform was made
possible primarily through the stability provided by the
Suchocka government. Prior to this, Poland had little continuity
in its reform efforts, as political considerations had forced the
resignations of individual ministers as well as entire govern-
ments; there had been no unified vision of where the program
was going and how it should accomplish its goals. Privatization
legislation proved to be a test of governmental support for eco-
210. See Nascent Markets in Eastern Europe and Soviet Union Exchanges Proliferate, But
Will They Lure Investors?, Bus. INT'L MONEY REP., Jan. 20, 1992.
211. See Polish Government Program, supra note 143.
212. Id. In fact, the SEC currently administers a technical assistance program in
Warsaw which advises the Securities Commission on points of law, investigation, and
enforcement. Id.
213. Christopher Bobinski, Polish Coalition Talks Hit, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1991, at 2.
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nomic reform; the public's support of these measures will be
seen in the general parliamentary elections.
C. Market Functions: Poland
1. Information Flows
Information about plans for a company's restructuring, as
well as its current financial condition, must be disseminated to
labor, government, and investors. 14 Polish firms are becoming
more involved in the actual negotiations that are conducted be-
tween the Ministry of Privatization and the foreign investors due,
in part, to the new State Enterprise Laws aforementioned. This
has served to alleviate the fears of many workers and managers
who were unhappy that they were not involved in determining
their companies' futures. Although Polish privatization has not
reached a stage where the availability of corporate financial data
is of paramount importance, upon ratification of the current leg-
islation on privatization, this information will be of critical im-
portance.
Bankruptcy law closely accompanies the privatization pro-
gram, and the free flow of information from creditors to debtors
is essential in order to assess risk and credit standing. Since
creditors currently can only consult a company's registration at
the Court of Registration in order to determine its financial situ-
ation, which is many times either unreliable or insufficient, this
type of asymmetric information will lead to imminent conflict
and problems.2 15
2. Capital Markets
Poland, advertised as a haven for Western investment in
1990, has had a disappointing record in attracting foreign capi-
tal. Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, which has a
combined population smaller than Poland's, have each attracted
more foreign investment than Poland.216 A variety of factors
214. SeeJohn Darton, Polish Parliament Rejects Bill to Privatize Industries, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 19, 1993, at A3 (stating that "[d]eputies who voted against the bill said they op-
posed the idea of foreigners having control over Polish companies, and many workers
fear that privatization could cost them their jobs through layoffs").
215. See GRAY, supra note 179, at 25 (discussing inefficiency of Court of Registra-
tion).
216. Blaine Harden, Sewing Up Success Against the Odds, WASH. PosT, Feb. 10, 1992,
at Al, A22.
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have contributed to the disappointingly low level of investment
in Poland: the massive foreign debt, the devaluation of the zloty,
and the chaotic political climate. Another reason is the attitude
of the Poles themselves. Many citizens fear that massive foreign
investment represents a significant threat to the Polish economy.
Some politicians, including former Prime Minister Olszewski,
have made statements hinting that Poland should not welcome
outside investment so heartily.217 Attitudes like Olszewski's have
made some Western firms leery of investing in Poland, especially
when Hungary and Czechoslovakia offered a viable alternative.
Some foreign investment has entered Poland. The first
bank to be privatized was the Wielkopolski Bank Kredytowy
("WBK").218 The European Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment invested U.S.$10.6 million in exchange for a minority
share of 28.5%.219
3. Financial Intermediaries
In April 1993, Poland's WBK became the first commercial
financial institution in Eastern Europe to be privatized and sold
to stockholders.22 ° Shares of the bank were sold to Polish and
foreign investors, including the European Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development, and are traded on the Warsaw Stock Ex-
change.22'
This privatization is the first of nine bank sales that are to
take place pursuant to the break up of the Polish National Bank
into nine parts in 1989.222 In preparation for the sale, Wielko-
polski undertook a private bank philosophy and stopped lending
to state-run firms and invested instead in Poland's entrepre-
neurs. Loans to private firms or individuals now comprise 45%
of the bank's portfolio where previously 95% were to state enter-
prises. 22 - The bank also undertook a depositor drive and nowboasts of 250,000 depositors who are served by forty-four
217. See Blaine Harden, The Art of a Deal in East Europr, Poland, WASH. Posr, Feb.
10, 1992, at Al (discussing lack of receptiveness of Poles to foreign capital).
218. John Pomfret, Bank Ptivatization to Put Poland in Forefront of Financial Reform,
WASH. PosT, Apr. 7, 1993, at C3.
219. Id.
220. See id. (discussing beginning of privatization trend).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
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branches.224
Despite this development, Poland's banking system has
been trying to overcome the Art-B scandal. The fall of 1991
brought revelations of a U.S.$360 million fraud perpetrated by
the Art-B financial company of Katowice. 22 15 The proprietors of
this company developed a pyramid of savings accounts through a
scheme made possible by Poland's lax banking laws and the inef-
ficiency of commercial banks. The Bank of Poland, the nation's
central bank, was forced to prop up Polish institutions bilked of
large sums by Art-B.226 The scandal illuminated the weakness of
the Polish banking system. Legislation has been very lax and
policies loosely monitored. Two top officials of the central bank
were arrested for their negligence in the Art-B affair.227 Three
banks were supposed to be sold into private hands in 1992, but
this sale was postponed until April of this year.221
In a recent interview, Minister of Justice Piatkowski was an-
swering questions about the Art-B scandal and stated that bank-
ing practices from the previous regime have remained virtually
unchanged. As a result,
opportunities for criminal malpractice in this sector are still
undiminished. However, nowadays persons who are prose-
cuted for financial malpractice also include chairman and di-
rectors of the banks involved, not only the offenders who ob-
tained loans from their banks by deceit.229
CONCLUSION
After applying the eight criteria to each of the countries,
one can conclude that the Czech Republic appears to be furthest
along in establishing the institutional environment and market
functions necessary to run a successful privatization program.
224. Id. But see Christopher Bobinski & Anthony Robinson, Poland's Banking Pliva-
tization Given $12. 7m Injection, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1993, at 28 (stating that Polish Na-
tional Bank has only 41 branches).
225. Christopher Bobinski & Hugh Carnegy, Poles Charged in Financial Scandal, FIN.
TIMES, Nov. 14, 1991, at 2.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. See BRE Sell-OffDelayed, FIN, TIMEs LTD., FIN. E. EUR., Apr. 24,1992, available in
LEXIS, World Library, FINEUR File (stating that Polish government was delaying first
bank privatization).
229. See New Minister of Justice Piatkowski Inteied, FBIS-EEU-93-092, May 14,
1993, at 9.
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Poland has been plagued by political instability as has the newly-
formed Slovakia whose leadership is unclear on the appropriate
pace of privatization. It is too soon to judge which of these coun-
tries will have the most successful reform effort, but certainly all
three are working towards creating the necessary framework.
